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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
STEVEN J. PYEATT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880274-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of the Issues, Statement of the Case, and 
Summary of the Argument are set forth in Appellant's opening brief 
at v., 1 and 6-7. Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to 
Points I and II of Respondent's Brief. Point III is adequately 
briefed in Appellant's opening brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The affidavit did not outline sufficient facts for a 
finding of probable cause. No one claimed to have seen cocaine 
inside the Montgomery Avenue premises or to have obtained the 
cocaine from those premises. The cases cited by the State are 
distinguishable from the present case on their facts; the facts set 
forth in the affidavit required speculation and reliance on 
circumstantial events, missing information and guesswork. 
Droubay acted intentionally or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth in preparing the affidavit. Without the material 
misrepresentations and with the inclusion of the material omissions, 
probable cause did not exist. 
In the event this Court determines that the fourth 
amendment was not violated in this case, Utah case law and the facts 
of this case require a different interpretation of the Utah 
Constitution, Pursuant to such interpretation, the entire affidavit 
and search warrant should be quashed where an officer includes 
misrepresentations of the facts or omits material facts 
intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth; where such 
misrepresentations or omissions are negligently made, a remedy 
should also be available. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT ARE 
INVALID UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
A. THE AFFIDAVIT WAS FACIALLY DEFICIENT IN THAT 
IT FAILED TO STATE SUFFICIENT FACTS FOR A 
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 
While the State is correct in asserting that a 
magistrate's determination of probable cause should be given 
deference (Respondent's brief at 5-7), such a rule of law does not 
mandate upholding a search warrant in all cases. In situations 
where the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
do not support a finding of probable cause, the search warrant must 
be quashed despite the deference given the magistrate. 
In the instant case, as set forth in Appellant's opening 
brief at 8-17, the affidavit in support of the search warrant did 
not establish probable cause to believe that cocaine and cocaine 
paraphernalia would be found in the premises at 533 Montgomery. The 
State suggests that in making such an argument, Appellant has 
engaged in a technical dissection of the affidavit or has asked this 
Court "to cut the circumstances encompassed in the affidavit into 
pieces for strict scrutiny to avoid the accepted Gates totality 
standard." Respondent's brief at 12. This is an incorrect 
perception of Appellant's argument. 
The Gates totality approach requires a reading of the 
affidavit "in its entirety and in a common sense fashion . . . ." 
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1102 (Utah 1983). In reading an 
affidavit in its "entirety," the various components of the affidavit 
must be reviewed. 
Where an informant supplied the information upon which 
the affidavit is based, the reliability of the informant and the 
basis of his knowledge remain two relevant considerations under 
Gates in assessing whether the totality of the circumstances support 
a finding of probable cause. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 
1987). As the Hansen Court pointed out, although these are not 
strict, independent requirements and a weakness in one or the other 
may not be fatal to the warrant, they remain as two factors to be 
considered. Hence, under Hansen and Gates, the reliability of the 
informant and the basis of his knowledge are considered against a 
background of the remaining circumstances in determining whether 
probable cause existed. 
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Just as the informant's reliability and basis of 
knowledge are two "nonexclusive elements to be evaluated" (Hansen/ 
732 P.2d at 130), the passage of time since the incidents outlined 
in the affidavit occurred is another factor to be considered when 
looking at the totality of the circumstances. The State correctly 
points out that "[a] mere passage of time does not necessarily 
invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant" and that the focus 
should be on whether "a common sense reading of that affidavit 
suggested the continuing nature of the drug's presence." 
Respondent's Brief at 13. In the present case, anywhere from five 
to sixteen days had passed since the second "buy" outlined in the 
affidavit occurred. The remoteness of the two buys when considered 
in conjunction with the remaining circumstances does not support a 
finding that an ongoing drug operation which was still in existence 
was occurring at the Montgomery address. Of particular support to 
this statement are the fact that only two buys occurred where a 
person drove to the Montgomery address and no one claimed to have 
seen cocaine inside the Montgomery address. Under such 
circumstances, the remoteness is critical - even if the cocaine had 
come from the Montgomery address, nothing suggests it would still be 
there .1 
The facts in Hansen are significantly different from the 
facts in the case currently before the Court. In Hansen, "the 
1 Of note is the small amount of cocaine seized at the 
Montgomery address. The amount found is less than one would expect 
for an ongoing drug operation. 
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suspect was known by the police to have been involved in drug 
violations." 732 P.2d at 131. In the current case, the affidavit 
contained no information that either "Randy" or Appellant were known 
to have been involved in drug transactions. 
Second, in Hansen, "[t]he informant viewed a large 
quantity of marijuana being sold in smaller quantities in the 
apartment" which was searched. J[d. In the present case, the 
affidavit contained no assertion that either "Randy" or the 
informant viewed cocaine in the Montgomery house. 
Third, in Hansen, "[t]he affidavit further averred that 
marijuana was still in the apartment." _ld. No such assertion 
occurred in the affidavit currently before the Court. 
Furthermore, in reaching its decision, the Hansen Court 
pointed out that the information supplied by the confidential 
informant which was "relied upon by police, was not some remote 
hearsay or assumption based on circumstancial events." I^d. at 130. 
The facts in this case are distinct since the information relied 
upon by officers was "remote hearsay" of "Randy" coupled with 
"circumstantial events." Hence, a comparison of the facts in the 
present case with those in Hansen does not support a finding of 
probable cause. 
In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), just as 
in Hansen, the confidential informant had actually observed the 
controlled substances inside the premises which were searched. Id. 
at 1259. Under such circumstances, a finding of probable cause is 
more compelling than a case such as the present one where no one 
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indicated that he had in fact seen drugs inside the premises to be 
searched and, in fact, the confidential informant did not even state 
that he had received the drugs from the person who had gone to those 
premises. 
In its brief, the State emphasizes the statement made in 
Appellant's opening brief at 9 that "the facts set forth in the 
affidavit may have raised a suspicion" and suggests that such a 
statement is a concession that probable cause existed in this case. 
Respondent's brief at 7, 10. The State's approach misinterprets the 
meaning of the word "suspicion" and asks this Court to engage in an 
exercise in semantics. 
The statement made by Appellant on page 9 of the opening 
brief is intended to acknowledge that under the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit, the officers may have had a heightened 
interest in the Montgomery Avenue residence. Based on that 
heightened interest or hunch, the officers then could have attempted 
to ascertain the name of the individual living in that house and 
collect further information which may or may not have amounted to 
probable cause. Appellant meant in no way to suggest that such 
heightened interest amounted to probable cause in and of itself. 
A suspicion is just a guess, an inkling, a hunch, or a 
thought that perhaps further scrutiny is required. A suspicion is 
less than a reasonable articulable suspicion as required under the 
Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 12 in order to stop a person 
for questioning and is much less than probable cause. The State 
attaches too much meaning to the word when it states "-ft] his 
admission alone undermines Appellant's entire argument of 
insufficient probable cause." Respondent's brief at 7. 
In its brief, the State asserts "[i]n many cases similar 
to this case, the courts have upheld the magistrate's issuance of a 
search warrant." The State then cites State v. Moore, 441 So.2d 
1003 (Ala. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Mena, 399 So.2d 149 (La. 1981); 
State v. Yaritz, 287 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1979); and People v. Chase, 
675 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1984). The facts in all cases cited are 
distinguishable from the facts in the present case, and those 
factual differences are significant in determining whether probable 
cause exists. 
In State v. Moore, cited in Respondent's brief at 11, an 
undercover officer had purchased cocaine directly from a cocaine 
dealer on the 9th and 15th of July. The officer again made 
arrangements to buy an ounce of cocaine from the same dealer on 
July 20. The dealer met with the officer on July 20 and sold him a 
half ounce of cocaine. At that time, the dealer informed the 
officer that he could not provide the additional one-half ounce and 
asked the officer to supply him with the money to purchase that 
one-half ounce. Officers then kept the dealer under visual 
surveillance while he went to the residence of the defendant where 
he purchased cocaine. The dealer then returned to the officer and 
gave him the cocaine. Id,, at 1003-4. 
The Moore Court recognized that "[s]ome courts have been 
reluctant to find a sufficient nexus or connection" (Ld. at 1005) 
for a finding of probable cause under circumstances similar to 
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this. In reaching its decision that probable cause existed under 
the facts of that case, the Moore Court found especially significant 
the fact that the dealer had made one sale to the officer, then told 
the officer that he needed more cocaine before going to the house in 
question. 
The facts in the instant case are significantly different 
from those in Moore. First, an officer, not a confidential 
informant, was the person who dealt directly with the dealer in 
Moore. In the present case, the officers are one step further 
removed from the house that was searched than they were in Moore.2 
Second, in Moore, the dealer made incriminating statements directly 
to the officer that made it clear that he intended to go to the 
house to obtain more cocaine. In the present case, no such 
statements were made by "Randy" to the confidential informant or 
directly to an officer. Nowhere in the affidavit does the affiant 
state that "Randy" claimed to have obtained the drugs from the 
Montgomery house or that "Randy" was in fact the dealer who gave 
drugs to the confidential informant. The reader of the affidavit is 
left to speculate that that is what occurred, but neither "Randy" 
nor the confidential informant made any such claims. 
In State v. Mena, an undercover officer was directly 
involved in the transaction as was the case in Moore. The 
2 The CI is an intermediary that did not exist in Moore. 
Furthermore, Droubay's testimony during the first sixteen pages of 
the transcript suggests that an additional intermediary existed— 
i.e. the CI made arrangements with "Randy," then a person other than 
"Randy" left the. house and drove to the Montgomery address. 
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undercover officer met with the dealer at about 8:00 p.m. for the 
purposes of purchasing a quarter ounce of cocaine. The dealer 
informed the officer that he had to get the cocaine from "his 
connection" and told the officer to meet him at another place in 
about fifty minutes. The dealer made a phone call and then drove to 
the apartment which was the subject of the search warrant. The 
dealer left the apartment about twenty minutes after entering with a 
male later identified as the defendant Mena. The dealer and Mena 
went directly to the location where the officer was waiting, and 
Mena participated in the sale to the officer. Immediately after the 
sale, officers arrested both the dealer and Mena. The dealer then 
told the arresting officer that he was obtaining his cocaine from 
Mena and there was another person at Mena's apartment waiting for 
the pair to return. Officers immediately went to the premises to 
secure it while other officers were obtaining the warrant. 
The facts in the instant case are significantly different 
from those in Mena. First, the officers were not as directly 
involved in the transaction; the officer in the present case dealt 
with a confidential informant, who appeared to have dealt with 
"Randy." Second, there were no statements attributed to "Randy" to 
the effect that his "connection" was at the Montgomery house. 
Third, the defendant in the instant case, Mr. Pyeatt, was in no way 
involved in the transaction. Officers did not even identify the 
occupants of the Montgomery house until after the search warrant had 
been executed. Fourth, the admission against interest made by the 
dealer in the Mena case that he had been obtaining his cocaine from 
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Mena and that others were at the apartment awaiting his return was 
especially compelling in that case. As the Mena Court pointed out 
"[a]dmissions of crime carry their own indicia of credibility 
sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to 
search" [citations omitted]." Ld. at 152. While the facts in Mena 
supported a finding that there was a "fair probability" that drugs 
would be found in the apartment, the facts in the instant case do 
not. 
The facts in State v. Yaritz, 287 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1979), 
are also significantly different from the facts in the present 
case. In Yaritz, the affiant officer had received information from 
several sources that defendant Yaritz was a drug dealer. Within a 
month of the affidavit, the affiant officer had received information 
that defendant Yaritz was still dealing in controlled substances and 
that he lived at a certain address in St. Paul. The affiant officer 
then made two controlled buys from defendant Yaritz through an 
informant. For each of those purchases, the affiant searched the 
informant, then gave him a sum of money to make the purchase. At 
the same time, a group of officers watched the premises where Yaritz 
lived and observed Yaritz leave those premises and go directly to 
meet with the informant. On each occasion, Yaritz gave the 
informant controlled substances after leaving his premises. The 
affidavit also indicated that officers had kept Yaritz under 
surveillance and had seen him meet with several people known by the 
officers to have been involved in narcotics violations in the past. 
When he met with these people for possible drug transactions, he 
used two different vehicles. The officers were able to supply the 
year, make and license number of each of those vehicles. 
The facts in the instant case are strikingly different 
from those in Yaritz. First, there is at least one additional 
intermediary in the present case. Second, the officers did not see 
anyone deal with the person who lived at 533 Montgomery and did not 
know who lived there. Nor did they see Mr. Pyeatt engage in 
possible drug transaction or persons known to have been involved in 
drug transactions enter the premises at Montgomery Avenue. Third, 
it was clear in Yaritz that the informant obtained the controlled 
substance directly from Yaritz, who had come directly from his home. 
In the present case, it is not clear from the affidavit 
that the substances came from "Randy" or from the Pyeatt home. 
There are much wider gaps in the present case which leave open the 
possibility that the controlled substance was in a vehicle, that 
someone else was at the Atherton home who supplied the cocaine, that 
the vehicle was used as a subterfuge in case the Atherton home was 
being watched, or that the Pyeatt residence was not at all involved 
in the transaction. The affidavit indicates that traffic was 
heavier at night and that the persons residing in the residence were 
usually away during the day. Such an assertion, however, is as 
consistent with innocent activity as with criminal behavior. The 
holding in Yaritz is simply not compelling in light of the 
significant difference between the facts in that case and the facts 
in the instant case. 
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Finally, in People v. Chase, 675 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1984), a 
confidential informant met with a dealer to arrange the purchase of 
an eighth of an ounce of cocaine. The dealer had told the 
confidential informant that he was the third person in a chain 
selling cocaine which originated in Florida. At the meeting, the 
dealer told the informant that he had to go to his source for 
cocaine and that he would meet the informant at another location in 
forty-five minutes. Officers followed the dealer to his own home 
and then to a second location. The dealer then met with the 
informant and completed the cocaine transaction. The trial court 
granted the motion to suppress, but the Colorado Supreme Court 
reversed, finding sufficient facts to support a finding of probable 
cause. In reaching its decision, the appellate court relied on the 
dealer's statement that he needed to go to his source for the 
cocaine. The Court pointed out that that statement "establishes the 
probability that he went to some third party residing at [the 
premises that were searched]." JA. at 318. No such statement 
occurred in this case. 
The facts set forth in the affidavit in the present case 
failed to establish a fair probability that cocaine would be found 
inside the Montgomery premises. Much speculation and reliance on 
circumstantial events, missing information, missing statements, and 
guesswork is required in order to reach a conclusion that cocaine 
was on the premises at 533 Montgomery. The affidavit contains no 
information that anyone saw drugs inside the premises at 
533 Montgomery or that the informant claimed that "Randy" had sold 
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him the cocaine. There were no statements by Randy that he needed 
to go to his source, and the officer was removed by at least two 
intermediaries from the activity at the Montgomery house. The 
affidavit requires that the magistrate rely not only on the 
confidential informant's information but also that of "Randy," who 
was an unknown in the operation. 
The facts as set forth in the affidavit failed to support 
a finding that probable cause existed to search the Montgomery 
house. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the issuance of a search 
warrant based upon a hunch, speculation, or mere heightened 
interest. In this case where the search warrant was not supported 
by probable cause, the fruits of the unlawful search should have 
been suppressed; Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial absent 
the illegally seized evidence. 
B. DROUBAY ACTED INTENTIONALLY OR WITH A RECKLESS 
DISREGARD FOR THE TRUTH IN INCLUDING THE MATERIAL 
MISREPRESENTATIONS AND EXCLUDING THE MATERIAL 
OMISSIONS. 
In Points IB and II of his opening brief, Mr. Pyeatt 
argues that Droubay acted intentionally or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth when he misrepresented certain facts and omitted other 
material facts from the affidavit. In its brief, the Respondent 
states that Mr. Pyeatt "has made no valid argument to show such 
omissions or misrepresentations were intentional or reckless 
disregard for the truth (sic)" and that "appellant has failed to 
consider the totality of the circumstances in his piecemeal attack 
on information contained in the affidavit". Respondent's Brief at 
16. 
Contrary to Respondent's statements, Droubay's testimony 
when read in conjunction with the affidavit establishes that he 
acted with the requisite intent. Furthermore, because it is 
unlikely that an officer who intentionally misrepresents facts in an 
affidavit will acknowledge that fact when subpoenaed for a motion to 
suppress, one of the few ways in which a defendant can establish 
that the affiant had the requisite intent is to analyze the 
testimony and the affidavit step by step. 
In the present case, the inconsistencies in the officer's 
testimony and his attempts to cover lapses, when considered in 
conjunction with the affidavit itself, establish that Droubay acted 
intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth when he 
prepared the affidavit. Droubay had been an officer for only two 
and one half years at the time of the incident (see Affidavit, 
Addendum B in opening brief at 2). Droubay was unemployed and no 
longer on the force at the time o£ the hearing on the motion to 
suppress (T. 4). Deputy Rigby, who had been on the force five 
years, acknowledged that he would have handled the case differently; 
in particular, he would have left officers at the Atherton address 
for surveillance (T. 75-77, 80). 
Defense counsel subpoenaed Droubay for the motion to 
suppress and directly examined him. During the first few minutes of 
direct examination, Droubay acknowledged that the focus of the 
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investigation was a person name "Randy" who lived in the Atherton 
apartment (T. 9), Droubay also acknowledged that there were usually 
two persons in the apartment: Randy, the focus of the 
investigation, who stayed at the Atherton apartment during both 
incidents set forth in the affidavit, and another "blonde-haired 
younger fellow . . . who we observed leaving the apartment both 
times. He was the driver" (T. 13). 
During this initial portion of testimony, Droubay also 
pointed out that the blonde-haired kid who was the driver was named 
Brad, and "[h]e was identified by first name to us by the CI at the 
time of the first controlled buy. We knew who was going to be doing 
the driving; we knew who we had to follow" (T. 15-16). Up until 
this point in his testimony, Droubay was working from his notes 
only. Immediately after the above quote, defense counsel supplied 
him with a copy of the affidavit, which Droubay reviewed before 
giving further testimony (T. 16). 
After reviewing the affidavit in which Brad is not 
mentioned and it is stated that the CI gave the money to Randy, 
Randy drove to the Montgomery address and Randy made a phone call, 
Droubay's testimony changed. He suggested that "it's common for 
dealers of controlled substances to use an alias" (T. 18). He 
testified that it was his initial belief that it was Randy who got 
in the car and drove to the Montgomery address. (T. 41). He also 
testified that Randy had been described to him by the CI and that he 
relied on such description to state in the affidavit that the person 
who drove to Montgomery was named Randy (T. 62). This is contrary 
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to Droubay's earlier testimony that he knew all along that Brad, the 
blonde-haired kid, would be doing the driving and was made only 
after Droubay became aware of the discrepancy between his notes and 
the affidavit. 
Later, on cross examination by the prosecutor, Droubay 
again stated that the blonde-haired kid was known to him as "Randy" 
despite his earlier testimony that he knew all along that a person 
other than Randy, a blonde-haired kid known as Brad, would be doing 
the driving and that Randy stayed at the apartment during both 
incidents (T. 47) . 
Droubay went on to suggest that the confusion about who 
Randy was resulted from Randy using an alias (T. 48). He suggested 
that the curly-haired kid was using the name of Randy (T. 52) and 
that the repeated references to the individual known as Randy in the 
affidavit were all referring to the same person (T. 52, 61). Hence, 
after reviewing his notes, but before reviewing the affidavit, 
Droubay acknowledged that someone other than Randy drove to the 
Montgomery address. However, after reviewing the affidavit and 
recognizing the significant misrepresentation that occurred therein, 
Droubay's testimony changed and he attempted to suggest that the 
person with whom the CI made arrangements and to whom the CI gave 
the money was the same person who drove the vehicle to Montgomery. 
This is contrary to Droubay's testimony contained in the first 
fifteen pages of the transcript. 
In addition, as set forth in appellant's opening brief at 
27, Droubay attempted to suggest that the Atherton apartment had 
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been covered by an officer despite the fact that Droubay had read 
his report and there was no indication in the report that such 
coverage had occurred (T. 38-9). The other officers involved, none 
of which were in charge as Droubay had been, clearly remembered that 
no one covered the Atherton apartment (T. 72, 74-5, 84). This 
apparent fabrication while testifying suggests the ease with which 
Droubay intentionally misrepresented the facts. 
Finally, as also set forth in appellant's opening brief, 
Droubay's misrepresentations about the day and night surveillance 
further suggest that, at the very least, he acted with a reckless 
disregard for the truth, and more likely, intentionally in 
misrepresenting the facts in the affidavit. 
As the Utah Supreme Court pointed out in State v. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), a law enforcement officer is 
aware of the need for accuracy and truthfulness in preparing an 
affidavit and such awareness should be taken into account when 
determining whether the officer had the requisite intent when he 
included the falsehood. That awareness, coupled with the serious 
inconsistencies in Droubay's testimony and his attempts to cover 
lapses show that Droubay acted with the requisite intent in this 
case. 
POINT II 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT ARE 
INVALID UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Respondent acknowledges that Mr. Pyeatt's argument under 
this section is "well taken" but contends that the circumstances in 
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this case do not warrant a different construction under the Utah 
Constitution, Respondent's Brief at 17. Contrary to the State's 
assertion, there is a basis for interpreting the Utah Constitution 
differently than the federal constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court was clear in stating that its 
decision in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986) was not 
dispositive of how the issue might be resolved under the Utah 
Constitution. I^d. at 192. Furthermore, in Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed. 2d 667 (1978), defense counsel 
conceded that where an affiant intentionally included 
misrepresentations in the affidavit, the appropriate approach was to 
excise the misrepresentations rather than quash the entire 
affidavit. Defense counsel in Franks also conceded that no 
violation would occur unless the affiant had reason to believe the 
included information was false. Hence, the rule in Franks v. 
Delaware that a remedy exists for intentional violations and that 
such remedy is the excision of the misrepresentations arose out of 
concessions of counsel and does not necessarily preclude quashing 
the entire affidavit or allowing a remedy when the 
misrepresentations were merely negligent. 
In this case where all of the evidence establishes that 
the officer intentionally included the misrepresentations, a 
question arises as to his veracity and reliability and as to the 
credibility of the entire affidavit. Under such circumstances, the 
entire affidavit should be quashed. 
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Just as in some situations, an officer's conduct is "so 
extreme as to constitute a due process violation under either the 
Utah or the United States Constitution," requiring that the 
government not use judicial processes to obtain a conviction (see 
State v. Colonna, 97 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 20 (1988)), in cases where a 
police officer deliberately misrepresents the facts or does so with 
a reckless disregard for the truth, the entire affidavit should be 
quashed. 
Furthermore, if this court determines that the testimony 
of Droubay when read in conjunction with the affidavit does not 
establish that he intentionally misrepresented the facts or that he 
did so with a reckless disregard for the truth, the numerous 
misrepresentations and omissions which significantly altered the 
facts known to Droubay at the time he prepared the search warrant, 
established that he was at least negligent in preparing that 
affidavit. Under such circumstances, the remedy outlined in 
Appellant's opening brief at 36-7 is appropriate. 
Hence, if this court determines that the warrant should 
be upheld under federal law, there is nevertheless a basis for 
deciding the case differently under the Utah Constitution. 
- 19 -
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/defendant, Steven Pyeatt, respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse his conviction and remand his case for a new 
trial without the illegally seized evidence or, in the alternative, 
dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted this /k? day of February, 1989. 
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